Thursday, May 9, 2013

J D Barnes METHODIUS, MAXIMUS, AND VALENTINUS Journal of Theological Studies, N.S., Vol. XXX, Pt. 1, April 1979

It is a notorious fact that a passage of more than two hundred lines appears, in identical or largely identical form, in three different works ascribed to three different authors:

(1) in Eusebius' Praeparatio Evangelica (vii. 22), where it is quoted as from Maximus, On Matter—a writer whom Eusebius elsewhere dates to the reign of Septimius Severus {HE v. 27.1);
(2) in the dialogue conventionally entitled 'On right belief in God' (De recta in deumfide), whose main interlocutor is named Adamantius and which was ascribed to Origen from the fourth century onwards (pp. 146.15-162.3);[1]
(3) in Methodius, On Free Will (5.1-12.8).[2]

The close similarities between the dialogue and Methodius continue beyond the point where Eusebius' quotation stops, and in both writers the passage quoted by Eusebius is preceded by another virtually identical passage of almost one hundred lines (pp. 135.25 ff. = On Free Will 3.1-4.5). In addition, the dialogue contains a number of very substantial similarities to Methodius' dialogue On the Resurrection, sometimes extending over several pages.[3]

What is the relationship between the three writers ? At first sight, it might seem that Maximus should be the source of the other two.[4] But a close comparison of Eusebius' quotation with the dialogue and with Methodius shows that, whatever Eusebius intended to do, he has in fact quoted Methodius, from whom there is hardly a single significant or substantial divergence in wording over more than two hundred lines.[5]

An explanation of how and why Eusebius does this must await an elucidation of the relationship between the dialogue and Methodius, but of the fact there can be no serious doubt. Eusebius, therefore, may be disregarded in a discussion of the relationship between the other two passages. The prevailing view of this relationship derives from an article published in 1888, in which Theodor Zahn argued that the dialogue copies Methodius, from which he deduced the inevitable corollary that the dialogue was written no earlier than c. 300.[6] Zahn's conclusion has subsequently been adopted by editors, translators and commentators, and in standard works of reference.[7] To the best of my knowledge, no scholar has contested Zahn's arguments or his main conclusion in order to argue that Methodius copied the dialogue. This latter view I hope, if not to prove conclusively, at least to render more plausible and more probable than the conventional one.

I

The dialogue De recta in deum fide is preserved both by several Greek manuscripts, of which only one is earlier than the fourteenth century,[8] and in a Latin translation made by Rufinus in 399, which survives in a single manuscript of the twelfth century.[9] This fact is very relevant to the date, the original title and the authorship of the dialogue. The form of the work is a series of linked but separate conversations in which Adamantius refutes the dualistic theories of five interlocutors. The Greek text consistently and clearly identifies the type of heresy which each espouses: Megethius and Marcus are Marcionites (pp. 16; 60; 96; 114; 200), Marinus is a follower of Bardesanes (p. 114), and Droserius and Valens are Valentinians (pp. 136; 152; 154). Rufinus translates accurately all except one of the passages which establish these identifications, but he also makes three additions, or glosses, external to the text of the actual dialogue, which have no parallel in the Greek: Megethius is twice described as a Manichee (pp. 3; 5) and Marcus as Marcionis schismaticus, ut sunt Manichaei (p. 61), where the Greek has merely MapKiajvioTrjs (p. 60). Zahn explained the contrast by the hypothesis that the Greek version, reworked under Constantine, omits the original references to Manichaeism.[10] That will not do. The whole dialogue is devoted to a problem as central to Mani as to Marcion, Valentinus, and Bardesanes: how many uncreated First Principles are there, one or more? Yet the heterodox ideas attacked are not those of Mani and his followers, but ones advanced by thinkers of the second century. The natural inference from that fact is that the dialogue was composed before Mani's ideas became familiar to the inhabitants of the Roman Empire, i.e. before the end of the third century.[11] In the three places where Rufinus refers to Manichees, he has surely glossed the original in an anachronistic fashion, precisely because he missed an allusion which he expeced the text to contain.

The relation of the Greek and Latin versions to the original appears to be different in a passage which refers to persecution. The Greek text describes persecution as a thing of the past, and expressly states that 'now the emperor is a worshipper of God' (p. 40.20)—which entails a date after 313. Rufinus' version, however, represents persecution as a contemporary phenomenon:

Meg(ethius) d(ixit): Vel ex eo quod in persecutionibus sumus semper, manifestum debet esse quod alterius dei sumus, contrarii huius qui fecit mundum et odit nos cum suo mundo. Denique sic scriptum est, quia cor regis in manu dei est (Proverbs 21.1), huius scilicet qui praeest huic regno et habet in manu sua cor regis et inclinat illud ad persequendum nos. Ad(amantius) d(ixit): . . .Secundum etenim hanc rationem quam dicis omnes reges, quippe quorum cor in manu eius dei sit qui adversatur bom dei famuhs et favet his qui sui sunt, deberent omnes omnino persequi Christianos, nee unquam aliud agere posteriorem liceret quam egit prior. Nunc autem videmus quod alios oderat llle qui prior fuit, et alios dehgit qui nunc est . . . . Sed nee nos soli persecutionem patimur. Et prophetae eadem passi sunt . . .. Similiter autem et Christi discipuli, exempla prophetarum sequentes, persecutionum saevitiam tolerant (1. 21, p. 41.12- 43-2).

Zahn argued that Rufinus here preserves the sense of the Greek original, which a reviser changed to meet the changed circumstances of Constantine's reign and a Christian emperor.[12] On the other side, V. Buchheit has contended that Rufinus, whom he brands as a notorious mistranslator, has perverted the original, whose composition must accordingly fall later than 324.[13] This latter opinion is implausible. First, it postulates a writer under Constantine who ignores all the theological issues of the late third and early fourth century in order to refute antiquated heresies which flourished in the second and third centuries. Second, it appeals to an estimate of Rufinus' capacities and honesty as a translator which has been vigorously challenged in the case of other works.[14] And third (though this is not so strong an argument), a motive for falsification of the passage is lacking, unless Rufinus be supposed deliberately to have altered the dramatic date of the original dialogue. Zahn's view of the relationship between the two passages remains by far the more probable.[15] But, if it is correct, then Zahn's date of c. 300 is too late. The passage quoted presupposes a single Roman emperor and virtually continuous persecution: that should exclude composition during the persecution which began in 303, when there were four emperors and when different emperors adopted divergent policies towards the Christians. On the natural interpretation of Rufinus' version, the allusions to the different religious policies of successive emperors suit the middle of the third century—and no other period, either earlier or later. Specifically, the successive emperors who loved and hated the Christians (apparently in that order) should be either Severus Alexander and Maximinus, or Philip and Decius.[16] Admittedly, the date of composition may be significantly later than the dramatic date of the dialogue, in which Adamantius is presumably intended to be Origen, who probably died in 252I4..[17] Nevertheless, no Christian writing much after 260 could plausibly represent persecution as a frequent contemporary phenomenon.[18]

Both its philosophical and its historical content, therefore, indicate that the dialogue ought to be dated long before the end of the third century.[19] Its author's name was known neither to Basil and Gregory nor to Rufinus, and it leaves no trace in the Greek manuscripts. The prologue which precedes the work in the manuscripts describes it as 'Dialogue of Adamantius, also called Origen, about right belief in God, with Megethius and Marcus, Droserius, Valens and Marinus the heretics', while an editorial note in the Philocalia observes that 'this passage is found word for word in Origen's dialogue with Marcionites and other heretics, where Eutropius adjudicates and Megethius opposes',[20] and Rufinus describes the work in similar words as libri Adamantii Origenis adversus haereticos numero quinque. The author, therefore, remains to be identified.[21] Nor does the late evidence of the manuscripts prove that the original title was 'On right belief in God'. Neither Basil and Gregory nor Rufinus seems to know what the dialogue was originally entitled: on the available evidence, the original title could have been 'Adamantius'— or even 'On Matter'.

II

The chronology of Methodius' career and works is obscure. Four facts, however, stand out. First, Methodius was alive early in the fourth century: in a work written in 310, Eusebius complained that he had recently turned against Origen, despite having praised him in the past.[22] Second, Jerome's report that Methodius was martyred 'at the end of the last persecution' should indicate that he died in 312 or 313.[23] Third, the long work On the Resurrection, which is overtly hostile to Origen, is later than the Symposium, which propounds some ideas which resemble Origen's and perhaps even derive'from him.[24] Fourth, the Symposium belongs to a period when Christians were not being actively persecuted, and was therefore written between c. 260 and c. 300.[25]

These facts suffice to render the hypothesis that the dialogue used Methodius highly improbable. First, Methodius appears, on the independent evidence, to be the later writer: in particular, the anti-Origenist On the Resurrection should have been completed towards the end of Methodius' life—therefore, hardly much earlier than c. 300. Second, it is implausible, on philosophical grounds, to suppose that the writer of the dialogue, for whom Origen is a figure of authority and deserving respect, closely copied a work devoted to attacking Origen's ideas. However, if it is Methodius' work On the Resurrection which copies the dialogue (not vice versa), that implies most strongly that the resemblances between the dialogue and Methodius' On Free Will also result from imitation by (not of) Methodius.

III

When Zahn argued that the dialogue copies Methodius, he did not undertake a close comparison of the two texts with an open mind. He argued rather from the general literary and artistic inferiority of the dialogue, and specifically that the introduction of Valentinus' doctrines in the dialogue reflects Methodius' dialogue-form in an inappropriate context.[26] A general argument of this nature should not be regarded as decisive, since some authors are capable of improving on models whom they imitate closely. Moreover, the specific comparison adduced by Zahn tends to support the opposite conclusion.

In the dialogue, a document is read (pp. 136-142), which is described as 6 opos TOV OvaXevTivov and TO 86yp.a OvaXevrivov and designated as a quotation from Valentinus' own writings (opOorarov 86y/j.a KO.1 opos aKAvirjS ixTtOels VTTO TOV aotf>ov OiaXevTivov). It begins as follows:

OvTcuol 8e TTCOS ev SiaTedeTodcu vofii^wv inl TT)V OIKIO.V avexu>pow TrjV ifxrjv Trj 8e eTnovor), TOVTCOTI orj/xepov, eX8d>v icopwv 8vo Tivds, Ofieyevels dvBpanrovs Xiyw 8rj, 8ia.TrX7)KTit,oixivovs KO.1 XoiSopov/xevovs OAATJACHS, erepov Trpos TOV erepov, TOV S' av irdXtv 6jj>inaT (pp. 136.25-138.4).

From the two men and their behaviour, the writer infers the existence of two gods, hostile to each other. Can this be an authentic quotation from Valentinus? Modern students of Gnosticism silently imply a negative answer by steadfastly ignoring the passage. It shows, nevertheless, a marked affinity of thought to something which Hippolytus reports: Valentinus said he saw a new-born baby which told him it was the Logos, then he added a tragic myth and thence derived his heretical ideas.[27] Similarly, the document quoted in the dialogue appeals to Greek mythology in the course of its exposition. As for the opening words of the quotation, they do not (as Zahn supposed) necessarily indicate derivation from a dialogue: they could come from a letter, and Valentinus (it is known) propounded his theories in letters which, artifice or not, read like genuine letters.[28]

In Methodius' dialogue On Free Will, the same passage is put into the mouth of one of the interlocutors, whose name may be Valentinus and who may be intended to be the heresiarch himself (3-5).[29] It occurs in a continuous passage, but what precedes does not perhaps perfectly explain why the speaker should have been in a good humour on the preceding day (2.1-9). Comparison of the passages, therefore, does not suggest that their relationship differs from that which chronological and philosophical arguments indicate: it is Methodius who imitates the dialogue, not the dialogue which copies Methodius.

It should be observed that this conclusion does not depend on the assumption that the quoted document is a genuine letter of Valentinus. It requires only the hypothesis that the author of the dialogue regarded it as such. However, if the dialogue does preserve a genuine, though unnoticed, fragment of Valentinus, then Methodius must be the imitator. Clearly the authenticity of the quotation merits a most careful examination by students of Gnosticism.

IV

If the preceding arguments are valid, the dialogue conventionally known as De recta in deumfide was written long before A.D. 300, probably close to the middle of the third century. Can its author be identified ? There are three possibilities—Maximus, Methodius, and unknown author—of which none can be completely excluded. The dialogue could conceivably be an early work of Methodius, which he later plundered when composing On Free Will and On the Resurrection, even though it differs greatly in style from Methodius' known writings. Alternatively, the author may be otherwise unknown. But the third possibility is the most attractive: that Eusebius has preserved the writer's name, even though he misdates him by fifty years. For if De recta in deum fide is indeed identical with Maximus' On Matter, then the cause of all the confusion can be elucidated. When composing the Preparatio Evangelica, Eusebius employed assistants to insert the quotations into the text which he dictated:[30] in this case, the assistant mistakenly inserted the passage of Methodius which so closely resembles the passage which Eusebius intended to quote—from Maximus' surviving dialogue on matter and the origin of evil.

Although it is dangerous to build hypothesis on hypothesis, this reconstruction will perhaps explain a divergence of traditions about Methodius' date and milieu which existed at least as early as 392: Methodius, Olympi Lyciae et postea Tyri episcopus . . .. Ad extremum novissimae persecutions, sive ut alii adfirmant, sub Decio et Valeriano, in Chalcide Graeciae martyrio coronatus est (Jerome, De Viris Illustribus 83).

The problem of deciding which episcopal see or sees Methodius occupied is notoriously difficult: Greek traditions independent of Jerome have Olympus and also Patara, while Tyre is often repeated from Jerome, and various items of late evidence state that Methodius was bishop of Side in Pamphylia, Myra in Lycia and Philippi in Macedonia.[31] It seems, however, that Tyre must be an error (perhaps Jerome misheard or misunderstood),[32] whereas for a bishop to move from the small town of Olympus to the important city of Patara is extremely plausible. Moreover, the setting of Methodius' dialogues, the Symposium and On the Resurrection, confirms a Lycian milieu. It may be proposed, therefore, albeit with diffidence, that Methodius was bishop of Olympus and then of Patara, and that he was executed at Patara on 20 June 312[33]—perhaps after a trial by the emperor Maximinus who may well have visited Patara during the summer of that year.[34]

The divergent tradition known to Jerome, which assigns Methodius to Greece and to the middle of the third century, may derive precisely from a confusion of Methodius with Maximus. Much commends the hypothesis that it was Maximus, the writer of the extant dialogue on matter and the origin of evil, who was martyred in Greece under Decius or Valerian. His work deserves to be restored to a historical and intellectual context, from which both Eusebius and modern scholarship have displaced it.[35]

[1] All references are given to the (admittedly unsatisfactory) edition of W. H. van de Sande Bakhuyzen, G.C.S. iv (1901). The new edition in the same series promised by V. Buchheit (Byzantinische Zettschnft, h (1958), p. 314) has not yet been published. Buchheit has, however, produced a separate edition, with commentary, of Rufinus' translation alone (Studia et Testimoma Antiqua, i, 1966).
[2] Edited by G. N. Bonwetsch, G.C.S. xxvii (1917), p. 157.6—178.9.
[3] Listed by van de Sande Bakhuyzen, op. cit., pp. xxxvui f.; Bonwetsch, op. cit., p. IX.
[4] E. Salmon, Dictionary of Christian Biography, iii (1882), pp. 884 f. This view appears to be reasserted by K. Mras, in his edition of the Praeparatio Evangelica: he holds that Eusebius quotes Maximus, whom Methodius copied (G.C.S. xlin.i (1954). P- 4O5)-
[5] J. A. Robinson, The Philocalia of Origen (1893), pp. xl ff.; 212 ff.—though he does not adequately distinguish between the separate questions of what Eusebius quotes and how Methodius and the dialogue are related.
[6] T. Zahn, 'Die Dialoge des "Adamantius" mit den Gnostikern', Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, ix (1888), pp. 193-239.
[7] Van de Sande Bakhuyzen, op. cit., p. xvi; A. Harnack, Chronologie der altchristlichen Litteratur bis Eusebius, 11 (1904), pp. 149 ff.; Bonwetsch, op. cit., p. ix; J. Farges, Methode d'Olympe: Du libre arbitre (1929), p. 6; A. Vaillant, Patrologia Orientalis, xxn (1930), p. 637; F. X. Murphy, Rufinus of Aquileia (345-411)- His Life and Works (1945), p. 124; J. Quasten, Patrology, ii (1953), pp. 146 f.; H. Musunllo, St. Methodius, The Symposium: A Treatise on Chastity (Ancient Christian Writers, xxvn, 1958), p. 3; G. Schroeder, Eusebe de Cesarie: ha Preparation livangehque, Livre VII (Sources chretiennes, cxv, 1975), p. 119; E. Junod, Origene, Phdocalie 21-27: Sur le libre arbitre (Sources chretiennes, ccxxvi, 1976), p. 67.
[8] viz. Venetus Graecus 496, probably of the twelfth century, from which all the other manuscripts appear to derive, cf. P. Koetschau, Theologische Literaturzeitung, xxvi (1901), cols. 475 ff.
[9] Discovered and published by C. P. Caspan, Kirchenhistorische Anecdota, 1 (1883), pp. 1-219, it is printed en face with the Greek text by van de Sande Bakhuyzen, G.C.S. iv, pp. 1-243—to which references are here given. [10] Zahn, op. cit., pp. 213 ff.
[11] Eusebius dates the entry of Mani's ideas into the Roman Empire c. 280 (Chronicle, p. 227 Karst; HE. vii. 31; Jerome, Chronicle 2231 Helm).
[12] Zahn, op. cit., pp. 205 ff.
[13] V. Buchheit, 'Rufinus von Aquileja als Falscher des Adamantiosdialogs', Byzantinische Zeitschrift, li (1958), pp. 314—28, and in his edition (1966), pp. xxxv ff.
[14] J. M. Rist, 'The Greek and Latin texts of the discussion on free-will in De Principus, Book III*, Origeniana {Quaderni di 'Vetera Christianorum', xii, I97S). PP- 97-n 1; H. Crouzel, 'Comparaisons pre'cises entre les fragments du Peri Archon selon la Philocalie et la traduction du Rufin', ibid., pp. 113—121.
[15] Van de Sande Bakhuyzen conveniently prints the words which have probably been altered in smaller type (p. 40).
[16] For the changes in imperial attitude in 235 and 249, see Eusebius, H.E. vi. 28; 39.1; 41.9 (a letter of Dionysius of Alexandria).
[17] Eusebius, H.E. vi. 14.10 ('ASa/uivTios (KH TOUTO yap fy TW 'Qpiycvfi vii.i (death).
[18] Eusebius, H.E. vii. 13 ff.; Lactantius, Mort. Pers. 4-6.
[19] It may be relevant that it puts the word '6y.oovoi.os' into Adamantius' mouth (p. 4.12): it was condemned by the council of bishops at Antioch which deposed Paul of Samosata in 268 (Athanasius, De Synodis, 43.1; 45.4; Hilary, De Synodis 8i-a; Basil, Epp. 52.1).
[20] van de Sande Bakhuyzen, op. cit., pp. xxiii; xi.
[21] Hence the theory that the dialogue was published anonymously or pseudonymously by a disciple of Methodius (A. Vaillant, Patrologia Onentalts, xxii (1930), pp. 646 ff.).
[22] Jerome, Contra Rufinum, i. 11 (P.L. xxiii, col. 423): 'Eusebius . . ., in sexto hbro 'AnoXoyias Origenis, hoc idem obiicit Methodio episcopo et martyri, quod tu in meis laudibus criminans, et dicit: Quomodo ausus est Methodius nunc contra Origenem scnbere, qui haec et haec de Origenis locutus est dogmatibus ?'
[23] Jerome, De Viris Illustribus, 83.
[24] Methodius, De cibis 1.1 (p. 427.10 ff.), expressly states that the Symposium has been completed, but that he is still working at On the Resurrection. For discussions of Methodius' 'Origenism', see H. J. Musunllo, St. Methodius, The Symposium (1958), p. 180.
[25] Musunllo, ibid., pp. 11 ff.; 175 f.
[26] Zahn, op. cit., pp. 231 ff.
[27] Hippolytus, Refutatio vi. 42.2 = Valentinus, frag. 7 Volker.
[28] Clement, Strom. 11. 36.2; 11. 114.6; 111. 59.3 = frags. 1-3 Volker.
[29] The manuscripts style the speakers 'OvaX ' (or 'Ova.' or 'Ov.') and "OpBoS (o|os)' (pp. 147.21; 156.14; 162 ff.). Bonwetsch expanded the contraction as 'OvaXevTiviavos' (in the index, p. 540). But the parallel of 'Thecla' in the Symposium suggests that the speaker may be Valentinus himself.
[30] K. Mras, G.C.S. xliii. 1 (1954), p. lviii.
[31] On the evidence and its evaluation, see especially F. Diekamp, 'Ober den Bischofssitz des hi. Martyrers und Kirchenvaters Methodius', Theologische Quartalschrift, cix (1928), pp. 285-308; Musunllo, op. cit., pp. 170 ff.
[32] Tyrannion was bishop for several years until his martyrdom c. 312 (Eusebius, H.E. viu. 13.3): there is, therefore, no niche for Methodius at Tyre at the appropriate time, cf. T. Zahn, Zeitschnft fiir Kirchengeschichte, viii (1886), pp. 18 ff.
[33] For the day, Synaxanum Eccl. Cpl., cols. 757-8, cf. Propylaeum ad Ada Sanctorum Decembris (1940), p. 404.
[34] Maximinus resided in Nicomedia from summer 311 to spring 312, and was at Antioch in July or August 312 (Eusebius, H.E. ix. ga.4; 6.3; 3; Malalas, p. 311 Bonn), apparently after visiting Panamara in Caria (Sylloge3 900).
[35] I am extremely grateful to my colleague John Rist for discussion of the problems which surround Methodius and for his careful scrutiny of this attempt to solve some of them.

Andrew Carriker on Maximus, Methodius, and HE V.27–28

Andrew Carriker's the Library of Eusebius which is available here as a free PDF. He writes p. 226:

Maximus, Methodius, and HE V.27–28 Eusebius concludes PE VII with a series of four extracts all devoted to the defense of God’s creation of matter.[154] The last of these extracts (PE VII.22) Eusebius attributes to the Περὶ τῆς ὕλης (De materia) of one Maximus who is otherwise unknown, save for Eusebius’ reference to him at HE V.27.[155]. The library of Caesarea must certainly have contained the works from which the other three extracts in this section of Book VII are taken, Dionysius of Alexandria’s work against Sabellius (VII.19), Origen’s Commentarii in Genesim (VII.20), and Philo’s De providentia (VII.21), so one may expect that the library contained and Eusebius used firsthand Maximus’ De materia, rather than some compilation on the subject of matter. But, there are complications. The extract at PE VII.22 also appears in two other works: in a dialogue entitled De recta in deum fide, the “Adamantine dialogue,” so called because the primary speaker is named Adamantius, and in Methodius of Olympus’ De autexusio (or De libero arbitrio).[156] The relationship between the versions of Methodius and the Adamantine dialogue has been much debated, but it appears that the Adamantine dialogue made use of Methodius’ work.[157] A comparison of Eusebius’ text with the texts of Methodius and the Adamantine dialogue, furthermore, indicates that Eusebius’ text is related to Methodius’ text, and the most plausible reason for this is that Eusebius copied his text directly from Methodius.[158]

Yet, it is difficult to explain why Eusebius attributes the passage to Maximus, if he copied his text from Methodius. Robinson suggests that “Maximus” was the first interlocutor in Methodius’ text and that Eusebius misunderstood this to be the name of the author, but there is no evidence in the manuscripts to support this argument. [159] Others suppose that Eusebius used a text that either was anonymous or was attributed to a pseudonymous “Maximus”.[160] But in these cases there is no explanation why Eusebius should assign this Maximus to the late second or early third century in his HE (V.27). Barnes argues that Maximus is the author of the Adamantine dialogue, that Methodius copied from the Adamantine dialogue, and that Eusebius’ scribe mistakenly inserted the text of Methodius rather than the text of Maximus.[161] The first of Barnes’s propositions is credible, and the second is possible (though it is a view unsupported by others scholars), but the third requires the belief that Eusebius possessed Maximus’ Adamantine dialogue, but his scribe (although he did not intend to draw the passage of PE VII.22 from Methodius) did in fact draw his excerpt from Methodius and neglected to revise the introduction that names the author as Maximus. While such a mistake is possible, it seems unlikely. What seems more likely is that Eusebius intentionally quoted the passage from Methodius and intentionally named Maximus as the author.

In the text of HE V.27 Eusebius places in the late second and early third centuries a number of writers and their works:

πλεῖστα μὲν οὖν παρὰ πολλοῖς εἰς ἔτι νῦν τῶν τότε σῴζεται παλαιῶν καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐναρέτου σπουδῆς ὑπομνήματα· ὧν γε μὴν αὐτοὶ διέγνωμεν, εἴη ἂν τὰ Ἡρακλείτου εἰς τὸν ἀπόστολον, καὶ τὰ Μαξίμου περὶ τοῦ πολυθρυλήτου παρὰ τοῖς αἱρεσιώταις ζητήματος τοῦ πόθεν ἡ κακία, καὶ περὶ τοῦ γενητὴν ὑπάρχειν τὴν ὕλην, τά τε Κανδίδου εἰς τὴν ἑξαήμερον, καὶ Ἀπίωνος εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ὁμοίως Σέξτου περὶ ἀναστάσεως, καὶ ἄλλη τις ὑπόθεσις Ἀραβιανοῦ, καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, ὧν διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἔχειν ἀφορμὴν οὐχ οἷόν τε οὔτε τοὺς χρόνους παραδοῦναι γραφῇ οὔθ' ἱστορίας μνήμην ὑποσημήνασθαι. καὶ ἄλλων δὲ πλείστων, ὧν οὐδὲ τὰς προσηγορίας καταλέγειν ἡμῖν δυνατόν, ἦλθον εἰς ἡμᾶς λόγοι, ὀρθοδόξων μὲν καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικῶν, ὥς γε δὴ ἡ ἑκάστου παραδείκνυσιν τῆς θείας γραφῆς ἑρμηνεία, ἀδήλων δ' ὅμως ἡμῖν, ὅτι μὴ τὴν προσηγορίαν ἐπάγεται τῶν συγγραψαμένων. Τούτων ἔν τινος σπουδάσματι κατὰ τῆς Ἀρτέμωνος αἱρέσεως πεπονημένῳ, ἣν αὖθις

So then, large numbers of treatises, composed with virtuous diligence by the ancient churchmen of that time, are still to this day preserved by many. Among those, however, of which we have personal knowledge, are the [works] of Heracleitus on the apostle; those of Maximus on that much-discussed question among the heretics, the origin of evil and that matter had a beginning; of Candidus on the Hexaemeron; of Apion on the same subject; of Sextus, likewise, on the Resurrection; and another work, of Arabianus; as well as the works of countless others, in whose case the lack of data prevents us from recording the times in which they lived or making any mention of their history. And the works also of many others, of whom we cannot recount even the names, have reached us: orthodox churchmen, as their several interpretations of the divine Scripture show, but nevertheless unknown to us, since such do not bear the names of their authors. HE V.27 (trans. Oulton [slightly altered])

The first part of the passage is a catalogue of the names of the authors and their works, providing, for example, no more information about Maximus’ writing than is given in the chapter-heading of PE VII.22.[162] Indeed, Eusebius admits that he has little information about these and countless other authors and, in the second part of the passage, in fact cannot furnish the names of other contemporary orthodox interpreters of Scripture.

At the beginning of the chapter Eusebius explains that the works (ÍpomnÆmata) he lists are ones that efiw ¶ti nËn . . . s–zetai, “are preserved still to [Eusebius’] day,” and are ones oen di°gnvmen, “of which we ourselves have learned.” Bauer casts some doubt on whether Eusebius, because of his somewhat vague words, actually knew these works.[163] But, these listed works are classified together with ka‹ êllvn d¢ ple¤stvn . . . Σlyon efiw ≤mçw lÒgoi, “the works of very many other orthodox ecclesiastical writers that have come down to us.” Eusebius’ language indicates that he possessed the works, in some form, of both the various writers listed in the first part of the passage and the anonymous interpreters of Scripture.

Eusebius seems, then, to have possessed a copy of a work on the origin of evil and the question of whether matter had a beginning, the author of which Eusebius believed was named Maximus. He also possessed copies of the works of the other writers listed: Heracleitus’ On the Apostle; Candidus’ On the Hexaemeron; Apion’s On the Hexaemeron; Sextus’ On Resurrection; a work of unknown title by Arabianus; and, apparently, other works, although Eusebius’ reference here may simply be a matter of exaggeration. Such a brief catalogue and such an admission of a lack of evidence do, however, indicate that Eusebius’ copies of these works were incomplete, perhaps even damaged.[164] Eusebius provides even less information about the orthodox interpreters of Scripture in this period than he provides about the writers listed before them. The works by these writers apparently were so similarly defective that Eusebius did not even know the names of the authors. Nevertheless, Eusebius seems to have possessed copies of these anonymous works.

There are two ways to solve the problems created by Eusebius’ references to Maximus. If Robinson’s argument is correct, then Eusebius possessed a copy of Methodius’ De autexusio (De libero arbitrio), although he only knew the work under the name of the author Maximus and under the title Per‹ t∞w Ïlhw. Perhaps because his copy was in some way defective, and perhaps also because the work was placed with other works of the late second or early third century, Eusebius incorrectly dated the work of this “Maximus.” When he chose to quote from the work in the PE, however, he accurately quoted the text he possessed, that is, the text of Methodius.

It is possible, on the other hand, that the work Eusebius knew as Maximus’ was actually the extant Adamantine dialogue.[165] If the Adamantine dialogue did use Methodius’ De autexusio (De libero arbitrio), then it will have been composed at some time in the late third century—after Methodius wrote his work but before Eusebius composed the HE.[166] Its author will, then, have been named Maximus, although from what Eusebius writes at HE V.27, he knew little more than Maximus’ name. Eusebius will have known so little that he incorrectly dated Maximus by two or three generations, perhaps, again, because of the defective condition of his copy and the placement of the work in the library. According to this reconstruction of events, Eusebius may have turned to Methodius’ De autexusio (De libero arbitrio) for the extract that he wanted in the PE because Methodius’ text was the more polished of the two versions. Moreover, Eusebius may have decided to name the earlier author simply in order to avoid mention of Methodius, for Methodius was, to judge from his De resurrectione and De creatis, a critic of Origen and therefore an intellectual foe. According to Jerome, Eusebius was quite aware of Methodius’ hostile attitude toward Origen.[167] Methodius’ millenarian views, with which Eusebius certainly disagreed, must have only separated the men further.[168]Although Eusebius ordinarily records accurately the authors of his quotations, he occasionally quotes a source as if firsthand that in reality comes from an intermediary.[169] Perhaps Eusebius did just this with Maximus and Methodius. There is no way to prove which of the foregoing explanations is the more accurate. I am myself inclined to think that Robinson conceives the more likely scenario, in part because it is the less complicated one. Eusebius’ relatively unspecific wording at HE V.27 suggests not that he did not possess any of the works listed there, for his vocabulary indicates otherwise, but that he had little knowledge of the identities and provenance of the authors. It is plausible that, as a result, he mistakenly believed that his copy of Methodius’ De autexusio (De libero arbitrio) was written by a late second or early third century author named Maximus. The scenario sketched here does not necessarily exclude the possibility that Eusebius consciously omitted Methodius’ name from the HE because of Methodius’ criticisms of Origen, for Eusebius’ statement in the Defense of Origen indicates that the library at Caesarea contained some other works by Methodius that were properly attributed to him.

Eusebius thus possessed a copy of Methodius’ De autexusio (De libero arbitrio), from which he drew the text of PE VII.22, although he believed the author to be named Maximus. He probably also had copies of some of other works by Methodius, most likely the Aglaophon: de resurrectione and Xeno: de creatis.[170] Eusebius will not necessarily have known the Adamantine dialogue.

A final note must be made about what Eusebius writes at HE V.27. Classed among the anonymous interpreters of Scripture is the author of a treatise against the heresy of Artemon, which Eusebius introduces at HE V.28.1 and then thrice quotes (HE V.28.3–6, 8–12, and 13–19).[171] Theodoret later supplies a title for this work, ı smikrÚw LabÊrinyow, the Little Labyrinth.[172] Artemon himself lived in at least the middle of the third century, since he is cited in the letter of the Synod of Antioch (268) (HE VII.30.16–17, in which he is called Artemas), so it is possible that the Little Labyrinth was composed as late as that period, somewhat later than Eusebius envisions it.[173]

[154] On this “dossier on matter,” see G. Schroeder, SC #215 (Paris, 1975), pp. 94–126, especially pp. 111–126.
[155] Eusebius places Maximus generally in the late second century or early third century, for he introduces the reign of Septimius Severus at HE V.26. Eusebius describes Maximus’ work thus: tå Maj¤mou per‹ toË poluyrulÆtou parå to›w aflresi≈taiw zhtÆmatow toË pÒyen ≤ kak¤a, ka‹ per‹ toË genhtØn Ípãrxein tØn Ïlhn (HE V.27) (translated below infra). Jerome’s notice of Maximus at De vir. ill. 47 derives from Eusebius.
[156] Less important appearances of this extract are the fragments in the Sacra Parallela and the epitome in Photius, cod. 236. The extract at Philocalia 24 is drawn from Eusebius’ text, although the passage is attributed to Origen under the mistaken apprehension that Origen composed the Adamantine dialogue (Adamantius was a nickname for Origen according to Eusebius, HE VI.14.10).
[157] Under the influence of T. Zahn, “Die Diologe des ‘Adamantius’ mit den Gnostikern,” ZKG 9 (1888), pp. 193–239, and J. A. Robinson, The Philocalia of Origen (Cambridge, 1893), pp. xl–xlix, scholars have maintained that the author of the Adamantine dialogue copied from the earlier work of Methodius. See, for example, L. G. Patterson, Methodius of Olympus: Divine Sovereignty, Human Freedom, and Life in Christ (Washington, DC, 1997), pp. 22–23, with note 12; R. A. Pretty, Adamantius, Dialogue on the True Faith in God: De recta in deum fide (Leuven, 1997), p. 12, with note 27. T. D. Barnes, “Methodius, Maximus, and Valentinus,” JTS 30 (1979), pp. 47–55, however, argues the reverse, that Methodius utilized the Adamantine dialogue.
[158] See J. A. Robinson, The Philocalia of Origen, pp. xl–xlvi.
[159] J. A. Robinson, The Philocalia of Origen, pp. xliv–xlvi. This view is criticized by A. Vaillant in his introduction to the Slavonic version of Methodius’ De autexusio, Patrologia Orientalis 22.5 (Paris, 1930), p. 639. Perhaps a similar explanation may be inferred from L. G. Patterson, “Methodius on Origen in De Creatis,” Origeniana Quinta (Leuven, 1992), p. 498, since Patterson, arguing that the De creatis was also called Xeno, makes analogy to Methodius’ other works, Maximus, on God and Matter and Aglaophon, on the Resurrection, the personal names coming from the principal speakers in the dialogues. Patterson, Methodius of Olympus, pp. 38–40, notes the absence of evidence in the manuscripts for a title “Maximus” or speakers named Maximus.
[160] Cf. A. Vaillant, ed., De autexusio, p. 652; E. Junod, “Particularités de la Philocalie,” Origeniana, H. Crouzel et al., edd., Quaderni di “Vetera Christianorum” 12 (Bari, 1975), pp. 184–185.
[161] T. D. Barnes, JTS (1979), p. 54.
[162] PE VII.22, chapter-heading: ˜ti mØ ég°nhtow ≤ Ïlh mhd¢ kak«n afit¤a.
[163] W. Bauer, Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity (Philadelphia, 1971), p. 149.
[164] G. Bardy, SC #41 (Paris, 1955), p. 74, note 2, suggests that the anonymous writers whose interpretations of Scripture were orthodox came in damaged copies, but this sugestion may apply equally to the other works that Eusebius names here. Perhaps Eusebius’ catalogue is a listing of the contents of a single incomplete or defective roll.
[165] T. D. Barnes, CE, p. 141, seems to accept this possibility.
[166] On dating the Adamantine dialogue, see R. A. Pretty, Adamantius, pp. 9–20.
[167] Jerome, Contra Rufinum, I.11: Eusebius . . . in sexto libro Apologias Origenis hoc idem obiicit Methodio episcopo et martyri, quod tu in meis laudibus criminaris, et dicit: Quomodo ausus est Methodius nunc contra Originem scribere, qui haec et haec de Origenis locutus est dogmatibus? (“Eusebius . . . in the sixth book of the Defence of Origen makes this same objection against the bishop and martyr Methodius that you complain of in my praises when he says: How did Methodius, who said such and such things about Origen’s doctrines, now dare to write against Origen?”) J. A. Robinson, The Philocalia of Origen, p. xlv, notes the possibility that Eusebius ignored Methodius out of hostility toward him. E. Junod, “L’Apologie pour Origène de Pamphile et la naissance de l’origénisme,” Studia Patristica 26 (1991), pp. 281–282, adds the suggestion that Pamphilus’ Defence of Origen was a response to Methodius’ De resurrectione. But, though he criticized Origen, Methodius also was indebted to Origen’s thought: see recently L. G. Patterson, Methodius of Olympus.
[168] On Methodius’ millenarianism, cf., Symposium 9.1–5. On Eusebius’ opposition to millenarianism, see, for example, W. Adler, “Eusebius’ Chronicle and Its Legacy,” Eusebius, Christianity, and Judaism, pp. 468–469. R. M. Grant, “Papias in Eusebius’ Church History,” Mélanges H.-C. Puech (Paris, 1974), p. 212, noticing this difference between Methodius and Eusebius, intimates that it was for this reason that Eusebius misnamed Methodius “Maximus” in the PE and HE.
[169] An example of Eusebius’ quotation of a source as if firsthand that in reality comes from an intermediary is: PE IX.4.2–9, 5.1–7, and 9.1–2, in which Eusebius ostensibly quotes Hecataeus of Abdera, Clearchus, and Choerilus of Samos, respectively, though all of the quotations come from Josephus’ Contra Apionem.
[170] P. Nautin, Lettres et écrivains chrétiens des II e et III e siècles (Paris, 1961), pp. 257–258, suggests that Jerome’s report of the works of Methodius at De viris ill. 83 was drawn from Eusebius’ catalogue of ecclesiasitcal works in the library at Caesarea that was included in Eusebius’ Vita Pamphili. If Jerome’s information does reflect what was available at Caesarea, then Eusebius’ library contained, in addition to the De resurrectione and De autexusio (De libero arbitrio), the Adversum Porphyrium, Symposium decem virginum, De pithonissa (another work against Origen), and commentaries In Genesim and In Canticum Canticorum. Nautin’s hypothesis, however, ought not to be given immediate approval, because Jerome clearly had a source different from Eusebius for his entry on Methodius, since Jerome confuses Eusebius’ contemporary, Methodius of Olympus, who perished in the Great Persecution, with a Methodius of Tyre, who reportedly perished under Decius or Valerian.
[171] HE V.28.1: toÊtvn ¶n tinow spoudãsmati katå t∞w ÉArt°mvnow aflr°sevw peponhm°nƒ . . . f°reta¤ tiw diÆghsiw ta›w §jetazom°naiw ≤m›n prosÆkousa flstor¤aiw. (“In a work composed by one of these against the heresy of Artemon . . . there is extant a narrative germane to our historical investigations” [trans. Oulton].) Apart from Eusebius’ quotations, his use of the word f°retai further indicates that the work was available to Eusebius.
[172] Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium, II.5 (PG 83:392).
[173] Artemon is not named in the extant fragments, and R. H. Connolly, “Eusebius H. E. V.28,” JTS 49 (1948), pp. 73–79, in arguing (following Lightfoot and Harnack) that Hippolytus was the author of the Little Labyrinth, necessarily suggests that the work cannot have been aimed at Artemon, since Artemon flourished a generation after Hippolytus. J. T. Fitzgerald, “Eusebius and The Little Labyrinth,” The Early Church in Its Context, A. J. Malherbe et al., edd., Suppl. to Novum Testamentum 90 (Leiden, 1998), pp. 120–146, rightly leaves the author anonymous; he would place the date of composition ca. 240–255 (p. 144).

J Armitage Robinson on the Parallel Sections in Adamantius, Maximus and Methodius [Part One]

THE EUSEBIAN EXTRACT.

Chapter xxiv. of the Philocalia has the following heading pre-fixed to it: Περὶ ὕλη, ὅτι οὐκ ἀγένητο οὐδὲ κακῶν αἰτία. ἐκ τῆ Εὐσεβίου τοῦ Παλαι τιναίου εὐαγγελικῆ προπαρα σκευῆ , λόγου ζʹ. The meaning of this is that although Gregory and Basil believed, as we shall see, that the section was the work of Origen himself, yet they found it convenient to copy it from Eusebius.

When we turn to Euseb. Praep. Ev. vii. 22 we find the passage immediately after a quotation from Philo on a similar topic. But its authorship is ascribed to Maximus.  Καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῦ Φίλωνος τοῦτον ἐχέτω τὸν τρόπον . Μαξίμῳ δὲ τῆς Χριστοῦ διατριβῆς οὐκ ἀσήμῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ λόγος οἰκεῖος συγγέγραπται ὁ Περὶ τῆς ὕλης . ἐξ οὗ μοι δοκῶ μέτρια χρησίμως παραθήσεσθαι εἰς ἀκριβῆ τοῦ προβλήματος ἔλεγχον, then follows the whole section as given in the Philocalia. 

But we also find the first quarter of the section, with what is evidently its immediately preceding context, in the fragment of the Dialogue of S. Methodius on Free Will, first published by John Meursius ( Var, Div, Liber Leyden, 1619). Moreover in the epitome of Methodius on Free Will given by Photius cod. 236 we have the whole of the section, slightly abbreviated here and there, together with summaries of what preceded and followed it in the work of Methodius.

I. Maximus or Methodius?

A difficult question is thus presented to us, and upon our answer to it must depend the principle on which we are to proceed in constructing our text. If Eusebius is right in assigning it to Maximus, we must suppose that Methodius took it from his Dialogue and inserted it without acknowledgment into his own; and in that case Eusebius is our principal authority, and we may regard the slight variations in Methodius as intentional modifications. But if Methodius be the true author, then we must look to him first of all and endeavour by critical processes to ascertain what he originally wrote.

But apart from our present object the question is of great interest, and it deserves a more accurate investigation than it has yet received. I may say at once that I have been led to the conclusion that Methodius is the original writer of the passage by the following considerations.

(1) We have no ground for supposing that an author of such power as Methodius would have cared to borrow without acknowledgment and without modification the main portion of a Dialogue by an earlier writer.

It is true that in the Dialogue on the Resurrection he makes one of his interlocutors quote at great length from Origen: but he is careful to give the exact reference, and to tell us that he has somewhat abbreviated the passage. Similarly he quotes by name from Athenagoras and from Justin Martyr; and we may reasonably suppose that he would have treated Maximus in the same way if he had had occasion to make use of his writings.

(2) The generally Platonic flavour of the passage is entirely in keeping with all the known writings of Methodius. The admirable work of Albert Jahn, entitled S, Methodius Platomzans enables the reader at a glance to appreciate the force of this argument. Not only is the passage in Dialogue form, but it treats a Platonic topic in a thoroughly Platonic spirit and in Platonic language, and shews the same facile handling of Plato's phrases which is so conspicuous, for example, in the Dialogue on the Resurrection. If Maximus were its author, then we should have in this otherwise unknown person another brilliant writer, at once a careful student and a conspicuously successful imitator of Plato. This argu- ment, together with the preceding one, has sufficed to convince Jahn, the most critical editor of the writings of Methodius, that Eusebius must have made a mistake in assigning the section to Maximus.

(3) A still more decisive argument is to be found in the examination of the context; and as this has not yet been fully drawn out I shall attempt to do it here.

The main part of the Dialogue has been reconstructed by Jahn from the fragment of Meursius and the epitome in Photius, together with portions of the so-called Adamantian Dialogue and fragments preserved elsewhere.

The Dialogue opens with a contrast between the deadly song of the Sirens and the harmonious hymns of the choir of Prophets and the choir of Apostles. We too in our day must learn to raise our hymn of praise. This we may do by a truth-loving discussion of divine mysteries. Then a speaker to whose words is prefixed ΟΥAΛ. (that is, probably, Valentinianus) describes how on the previous afternoon he had observed the beauties of nature in sea and sun and moon, and had been led to praise their Maker. On his way home he had been startled by witnessing the most fearful crimes, robbery, bloodshed and adultery ; and had been led to ask whether God could possibly be the Maker of these as well. He then announces his conclusion that Matter is eternally coexistent with God, that the choicer parts of it were ordered by God in the Creation of the world, while the dregs which remained became the source of evil.

The section in dispute is the beginning of the answer to this statement, and it is headed OPΘO∆. in Meursius's fragment. After its close our knowledge of the Dialogue is unhappily more scanty: but we can see that the question of the origin of evil among men is especially dealt with ; and this necessitates the discussion of Free Will which follows, and which has given its name to the whole Dialogue. The general harmony of the section with these surroundings will be obvious to every reader of it as it stands in our text (pp. 212 ff). We must now look into details, and these may best be presented side by side under three main heads

- SECTION FOLLOWS (not reproduced here) -

The above instances, especially if considered in their contexts, sufficiently establish the close relation between all the extant parts of the Dialogue. We have in it a carefully planned and quite consistent piece; nor are there any traces whatever of compilation. The whole is the work of one writer, and a comparison of his other works makes it difficult to resist the conclusion that the writer is Methodius.

But if this be so, how are we to account for the express state- ment of Eusebius prefixed to the extract and quoted above?

(a) His only other mention of this Maximus carries us no further. It is in H. E. v. 27, where, after mentioning the works of Irenaeus, he gives a list of authors, τῶν τότε σῴζεται παλαιῶν καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικῶν ἀνδρῶν, Heraclitus, Candidus, Apion, Arabianus and others, whose writings he knows, but of whom he tells us that he has no means of ascertaining and recording either their dates or any other information about them. Among these he mentions : καὶ τὰ Μαξίμου περὶ τοῦ πολυθρυλήτου παρὰ τοῖς αἱρεσιώταις ζητήματος τοῦ πόθεν ἡ κακία , καὶ περὶ τοῦ γενητὴν ὑπάρχειν τὴν ὕλην, This is little more than an echo of the heading he has prefixed to the extract. We may perhaps conclude that Eusebius knew nothing more of Maximus than that he was, as he supposed, the author of the Dialogue in question, which he could not date, but which he referred to a period when the topic of the origin of evil was much discussed.

(b) But if Eusebius knew practically nothing of Maximus, he cannot have been equally ignorant of Methodius. It is true that he does not mention him in his Ecclesiastical History, although according to Jerome (Catal. 83) he was a martyr at the close of the Diocletian persecution. But in his Defence of Origen he speaks of him as a contemporary, and asks: Quomodo ausus est Methodius nunc contra Origenem scribere, qui haec et haec de Origenis locutus est dogmatibus?' These words were written about 308A.D., and refer no doubt in part to the Dialogue on the Resurrection, in which the views of Origen are quoted and severely attacked. It is possible that Methodius apart from his writings did not play an important part in the events of his time, and that Eusebius may have been tempted to omit him altogether on account of his attack on Origen. Socrates (H. E, vi. 13) depreciates him on this ground, and classes him with Eustathius, Apolinarius and Theophilus, whom he terms εὐτελεῖς, who, unable to gain a reputation on their merits, sought one by attacking their betters.

(c) The date of the Dialogue on Free Will is a not unimportant factor in the question. The speaker who holds the eternity of matter is represented as coming to his view quite independently from his own observation of the evils around him, and as being quite ready to exchange his tentative theory for a better if it can be found. The exponent of the true view, too, says that he is not at all surprised at the other's conclusion. The same experiences have led other minds in the same direction : καὶ γὰρ πρὸ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ πολλοί τίνες ἄνδρες ἱκανοὶ περί τούτου τὴν μεγίστης ζήτησιν ἐποιήσαντο. καὶ οί μέν όμοίως διετέθησαν σοί κ.τ.λ.. Here the view of Origen, though differing in some important points from the Valentinian view, may perhaps be included ; but no harsh word is spoken : nor indeed is there any trace of bitterness against any one in the whole discussion, the temper of which is quite ideal. If we contrast with this the tone of the Dialogue on the Resurrection, in which Origen is accused of specious arguments and deceitfulness and is even compared to the Sirens, we shall feel convinced that the Dialogue on Free Will must belong to a much earlier period. It might perhaps be put back even as far as 270A.D.; in which case it would be forty years old when Eusebius quoted from it; and so his error might be the more explicable.

(d) Bandini in his Laurentian Catalogue (1. 430), after mentioning a fragment of Methodius of the xth century, beginning and ending as in the edition of Meursius, says:  In codice uero in duas partes diuisum : cuius secundae, quae incipit a uerbis, ὅτι μέν ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον titulus est: περί θεοῦ καὶ ὕλης. This rubric is not given by Meursius : but we may well believe that if it pre- ceded the extract in the copy which Eusebius used it may have facilitated his mistake. Meursius divides the speeches of the interlocutors by the words ΟΥAΛ. and OPΘO∆. Now it is contrary to the manner of Metho- dius not to give names of his own invention to his speakers, and ορθόδοξος can hardly be a proper name. One is tempted to suggest that the name of the orthodox speaker was Maximus in which case that name might have stood at the head of the Eusebian extract which is now headed OPΘO∆. in Meursius, and indeed the whole Dialogue would probably have been known as Μαξίμος ἣ περὶ τοῦ αὑτεξουσἰου. If this were the case the error of Eusebius would be satisfactorily explained. [Robinson, Philocalia  - xl - xlvi]
 
This is hardly a compelling explanation. Once again, this is only the most superficial of explanations which deliberately postpones dealing with Adamantius in order to posit Methodius as the ultimate source.   Luckily for us Harris already disposes of Robinson's misrepresentation of the state of things here.  Harris's arguments dispose of these claims.

De-Constructing De Recta in Deum Fide

By far the worst characteristic of scholars - and I mean a very widespread, awful trait that pervades scholarship in Christian antiquity - is the need to systematize.  Perhaps I am guilty of reading too much Nietzsche growing up.  No, let me restate that - I admit that I read way, way too much Nietzsche growing up.  Nevertheless his main point about scholars being wimpy and ultimately dangerously myopic systematizers is a legitimate one. 

Once you get used to the way these knuckleheads think - their instinct to 'smooth things over' for widespread acceptance of their otherwise ignored endeavors - you can't help hate the whole bunch of them.  For there is something noble about laboring in obscurity (of course I am somewhat biased in that regard).  Yet once you see a scholar essentially cop out and consistently try and 'de-weird' a text - in otherwise make it 'fit' within the most convenient scenario which requires little or no change to our existing paradigm, you can't help but hate that person or at least hate their intellectual cowardice. 

I felt this very same reaction when I was reading again Pretty's attempt to make sense of the parallel noted by the authors of the Philocalia when they noted that a parallel exists between Eusebius's reference to a section of material associated with an otherwise unknown 'Maximus' who lived at the turn of the third century and a certain work of Methodius who we presume lived at the end of the third century.  Pretty cops out of this difficulty by choosing the path of least resistance - undoubtedly because it gets in the way of publishing his translation.  But his conclusions are untenable - not in the least of which because of Harris's arguments.

Pretty seems only interested in the question of whether Origen was Adamantius.  Yet there is a deeper question of continuing parallels between the writings of Methodius and the Dialogue.  In this case Pretty is dealing with the trifecta of common references to 'the problem of matter' in Maximus, Methodius and the Dialogue.  Yet Harris points to a similar parallel between Methodius and the Dialogue where both sources must have corrupted an original source dealing with 'Marcion' into one which purportedly ascribed these details to a 'Valentinian.'  This is very critical and Harris's thesis calls into question Pretty's 'cop out' solution making Maximus a disciple of Methodius which simply isn't possible given the evidence. 

Here is Pretty's discussion of the question of parallels between Methodius, Maximus and the Dialogue:

Eusebius' Praeparatio Evangelica seems to have been commenced during the persecution of Diocletian (303-311), but it was not concluded until some time afterwards, judging from the references in it to contemporary events (and absence of reference to the Constantinian victories).

The name "Maximus" constitutes a problem quite apart from the Adamantian Dialogue. As we have already seen, Eusebius states that the extract from another writer incorporated in his Praep. Evang., 21 was from a work by Maximus. His actual words are: "However, as a book singularly appropriate to the subject, 'Concerning Matter,' has also been written by Maximus, a distinguished member of the Christian faith, I have resolved to adduce from this work material pretty relevant to the proper discussion of the question before us" (Praep. Evang. 2.7.21). However, Robinson has shown reasonably satisfactorily, through a careful analysis of this 'material' (or extract), that it was really taken from a book by Methodius, not Maximus (of whom we know pratically nothing); cf. Robinson's Philocalia pp. xl - xlvi.

We are thus left with the question, How did Eusebius get the name of Maximus mixed up with the work of Methodius? The matter is further complicated, as previously indicated, by the fact that his very same extract is found in the Dialogue of Adamantius. The extracts, however, are not exactly parallel, for the author of our Dialogue began his borrowing at a point in the Methodian dialogue prior to that at which Eusebius' excerpt commences, and continued to use Methodius' work for some time after the Eusebian borrowing has concluded. This result has one important fact relative to the Dialogue of Adamantius: obviously the Adamantian author made his extract directly from Methodius, and not indirectly through Eusebius. We are not, therefore obliged to postulate a date for the composition of the Dialogue of Adamantius subsequent to Eusebius.

There still remains the question of Eusebius' association of the name of Maximus with the Dialogue of Methodius Apart from the passage in the Praep. Evang. already given, there is only one other place where Eusebius mentions Maximus at all: Hist, eccl., 5, 27: "Moreover, there are still preserved by many large numbers of writings composed with commendable zeal by men of the early Church living at the time [i.e., the period of the emperors Commodus to Septimius Severus, 180-211]. From those of which we ourselves do indeed have certain knowledge might be mentioned the treatise of Hera- cleitus, 'On the Apostle': that also of Maximus, on the question much debated among the heretics, 'The Origin of Evil,' and and 'Concerning the Origin of Matter'...."

From this passage, it appears that Eusebius thought of Maximus as living somewhere about the beginning of the third century, but the extract he quotes comes from a book of Methodius who died c. 311 CE. Therefore it seems clear that a) Eusebius did not know the true author of the passage he was extracting from Methodius' dialogue On Free Will; b) he assumed that the author was Maximus because he had heard that a certain person of that name had written on a similar subject. This Maximus he placed at the end of the second century because the question of the origin of evil and free will was much discussed at the time. If, however, the theory advanced in this thesis be correct, Maximus was none other than a disciple Methodius, and the author of the Dialogue of Adamantius. But until more information is forthcoming, such theories can be little more than guesses. [p. 19]

It should be noted that Pretty completely ignores Harris's work throughout his translation of De Recta in Deum Fide.  Again this can be attributed to his single-minded focus on the question of whether Origen = Adamantius. 

I am not prepared at the present moment to put forward my own theory but it is worth noting that Methodius himself is something of an enigma.  We almost know as little about Methodius as we do Maximus.  Methodius is dated to the late third century because of his work against Porphyry but even these quotations may have been ascribed to him after his death.  The basic point we have to consider here is that Eusebius does not mention Methodius and our other sources only identify him as a contemporary and hostile witness to Origen.  My suspicion is that Methodius was an Alexandrian who rejected Origen - possibly even Clement of Alexandria, thus explaining the silence over their 'teacher-student' relationship in later sources.  But again this explanation is only in its preliminary stages and might not be supported until further research is completed.  It's just a hunch. 

In any event here is the citation of text from Eusebius Prepar. Evang. cited above:
 
Let this suffice to show the character of Philo's opinions. Maximus too, a man not undistinguished in the Christian life, has composed a special treatise Concerning Matter; from which I think it will be useful to quote some sentences of moderate length, for the accurate decision of the question before us.

'I DO not suppose that you any more than myself are ignorant that it is impossible for two unoriginate things to subsist together, although you certainly seem to have attached to your argument this presupposition, that it is absolutely necessary to affirm one of two things, either that God is separate from matter, or on the other hand that He is inseparable from it.

'Should any one therefore choose to say that He is united with it, that will be an assertion that the Uncreate is one only; for each will be a part of the other, and being parts each of the other they will not be two uncreated, but one consisting of different parts; for as we do not say that man though consisting of different parts is broken up into the small coin of many created things, but, as reason requires, we say that man is one being of many parts created by God, so, if God is not separate from matter, we must necessarily say that the Uncreated is one only.

'But if any one shall affirm that He is separate, there must of necessity be something that is intermediate between the two, which also makes their separation evident. For it is impossible that one thing can be proved to be separate from another, when there is no third in which the separation between them is found. And this stands true not only in this and any single case, but in very many.

'For the argument which we used in the case of two uncreated beings must necessarily succeed equally well, if the uncreated things were admitted to be three. For in their case also I should ask, whether they are separated one from another, or on the contrary each united to his neighbour.

'So if any one should choose to say that they were united, he will receive the same answer as the first; but if, on the contrary, that they are separated, he cannot avoid the necessary existence of something that separates them.

'But if perchance any one should say that there is also a third statement which may fitly be made concerning things uncreated, that is, that God is not separated from matter, nor on the other hand united with it as a part, but that God exists as it were locally in matter or matter in God, let him receive the conclusive answer, that if we call matter the place of God, we must of necessity say that He can also be contained, and is circumscribed by matter.

'Moreover He must be carried about like matter in a disorderly way, and does not remain settled and constant in Himself, when that in which He exists is carried now this way and now that. And besides this we must also say that God has existed in things of worse nature. For if matter was once without order, and He wishing to change it for the better put it into order, there was a time when God was in things without order.

'I might also fairly ask this question, whether God completely filled matter, or was in some portion only of it. If then any one should choose to say that God was in some portion of matter, he makes Him very much smaller than matter, if indeed a part of it contained the whole of Him: but if he should say that God is in all matter, he has to explain how He was to work upon it. For he must either say that there was a sort of contraction of God, and that when this was effected He wrought upon that part from which He had receded; or else that He wrought upon Himself together with the matter, not having any place into which He could withdraw.

'If however any one shall say that matter is in God, it is equally necessary to inquire whether it is by God's being separated from Himself, just as tribes of living creatures subsist in the air, by its being divided and parted for the reception of the creatures that arise in it; or whether matter is in God as in a place, that is, as water is in land.

'For if we should say, "As in the air," we must necessarily say that God is divisible: but if, "As water is in land," and if matter was in confusion and disorder, and moreover contained evils, we are compelled to say that God is the place of disorder and evil: which seems to me an irreverent statement, nay more, a dangerous one. For you claim the existence of matter in order to avoid calling God the author of evil, and while wishing to escape from this you say that He is the receptacle of evil.

'Now if you had said that from the nature of existing creatures you supposed matter to be uncreated, I should have had much to say about matter in proof that it cannot possibly be uncreated. But since you said that the origin of evil was the cause of such a supposition, I therefore think it well to proceed to the examination of this latter point. For when a clear statement has been given of the mode in which evils exist, and of the impossibility of denying that God is the author of evil, if matter is attributed to Him, I think that such a supposition is utterly overthrown.

'You say then that co-existing from the beginning with God there is matter without qualities, out of which He formed the beginning of this world? '

'Such is my idea.'

'Well then, if matter was without qualities, and if the world has been made by God, and there are qualities in the world, God must have been the maker of the qualities.'

'That is true.'

'Now since I heard you say before, that it is impossible for anything to be made out of the non-existent, answer me this question of mine. Do you think that the qualities of the world have not been produced out of pre-existing qualities?'

'I think so.'

'But are something else besides the substances?'

'That is so.'

'If then God made the qualities neither out of pre-existing qualities, nor out of the substances, because they are not themselves substances, we are compelled to say that they have been made by God out of non-existents. And hence I thought it was too much for you to say, that it was impossible to suppose that anything has been made by God out of non-existents.

'However, let the argument on this point stand as follows: Even among ourselves we see men making some things out of what is non-existent, however much they seem to be making them in some material: as for instance let us take our example in the case of architects. For they make cities not out of cities, and temples in like manner not out of temples.

'But if, because there are substances underlying these things, you suppose that they make them out of existing things, your argument deceives you. For it is not the substance that makes the city, or the temples, but the art which is employed about the substance; and the art is not produced out of some underlying art in the substances, but is produced out of an art which is non-existent in them.

'But I suppose you will meet my argument in this way, that the artist makes the art which is in the material substance out of the art which he has in himself. Now in answer to this I think it may fairly be said, that it is not produced even in the man out of any underlying art. For it is not possible to grant that the art exists independently by itself, since it is one of the accidents, and one of those things which have existence given to them at the moment when they are produced in a substance.

'For the man will exist even apart from his skill as an architect, but this will have no existence unless there be first a man. And hence we are compelled to say that it is the nature of the arts to be produced in men out of what is non-existent. If therefore we have now shown this to be so in the case of men, why was it not proper to say that God was able to make not only qualities but also substances out of what was non-existent? For the proof that it is possible for something to be made out of what is non-existent shows that this is the case with the substances also.

'But since you are anxious to inquire concerning the origin of evil, I will pass to the discussion of that subject. And I wish first to ask you a few questions. Do you think that evils are substances, or qualities of substances?

'I think it is right to say that they are qualities of substances.

'But matter, we said, has no quality nor shape?

'So I declared in the preface to my argument.

'If therefore evils are qualities of substances, and matter had no qualities, but God, you said, was the maker of qualities, God must be also the creator of evils. When therefore even in this way it is impossible to say that God is not the cause of evils, it seems to me superfluous to attach matter to Him. But if you have anything to say against this, begin your argument.

'If our inquiry arose out of contentiousness, I should not think it right to give a second definition of evils: but since it is rather for the sake of friendship and the benefit of our neighbour that we are examining the questions, I think it right to allow a new definition concerning them.

'I think it must have been long manifest to you, that my purpose and my earnest desire in our arguments is, that I do not wish to gain a victory by plausible statement of falsehood, but that the truth should be shown by means of accurate inquiry. And I clearly understand that you also are so disposed. Wherefore employ without any diffidence whatever kind of method you think will enable you to find the truth: for by employing the better method you will benefit not only yourself, but certainly me also on matters of which I am ignorant.'

'I think you plainly admitted that evils also are a kind of substances? '

'Yes, for I do not see them existing anywhere apart from substances.'

'Since then you say, my good sir, that evils also are substances, it is necessary for us to examine the definition of substance. Is it your opinion that substance is a kind of concrete body? '

'It is.'

'And does the concrete body subsist of itself independently, not requiring anything from whose previous existence it may receive its being? '

'Just so.'

'And do you think that evils depend on action of some kind? '

'So it seems to me.'

'And do actions come into being at the moment when the agent is present?'

'Such is the case.'

'And when the agent does not exist, there will never be any action of his? '

'There will not.'

'Well then, if substance is a kind of concrete body, and this requires nothing in union with which it may begin to exist, and if evils are actions of some agent, and if actions do require something in union with which they begin to exist, evils cannot be substances.

'But if evils are substances, and murder is an evil, murder will be a substance: yet surely murder is an action of some one, and so murder is not a substance. If however you mean that the agents are substances, I too agree. For example, a man who is a murderer, in respect of his being man is a substance: but the murder which he does is not a substance, but a work of the substance.

'So we say in one case that the man is evil, because of his committing murder, and in a contrary case that he is good, because of his doing good. And these names are attached to the substance in consequence of its accidents, which are not itself: for the substance is not murder, nor again adultery, or any of the like evils. But just as the grammarian is named from grammar, and the rhetorician from rhetoric, and the physician from the art of physic, though his substance is neither the art of physic nor yet rhetoric, nor grammar, but receives the name from its accidents, from which it seems fit to be so called, although it is neither one nor the other of them, in like manner it appears to me that the substance also acquires an additional name from what are thought to be evils, though it is neither of them.

'And in like manner if you imagine some other being in the mind as the cause of evils in men, I would have you consider that he also, inasmuch as he works in them and suggests the doing evil, is himself evil in consequence of what he does. For he too is said to be evil for this reason that he is the doer of evils. But the things which any one does are not himself, but his actions, from which he receives the name of being evil.

'For if we were to say that he himself is what he does, and if he does murders and adulteries and thefts and all the like, then he himself is these: and if he is himself these, and these gain real existence at the time of being done, and in ceasing to be done cease to exist, and it is by men that they are done----then the men must be the makers of themselves and the causes of their own being and ceasing to be.

'Whereas if you say that these are his actions, he has the character of being evil from what he does, not from what constitutes his substance. But we said that a man is called evil from the accidents pertaining to his substance, which are not the substance itself, as the physician from the art of physic.

'If then each man is evil in consequence of his actions, and if his actions receive a beginning of existence, then that man also began to be evil, and these evils too had a beginning. And if this is so, a man will not be without a beginning in evil, nor evils un-originate, because we say that they originate with him.'

'The argument against your opponent you seem to me, my friend, to have completed satisfactorily. For from the premises which you assumed for your argument you seemed to draw the conclusion fairly. For in very truth, if matter was without qualities, and God is the maker of qualities, and evils are qualities, then God must be the maker of evils.

'As to the argument then against that opponent, let us grant that it has been well stated: but in my opinion it is false to say that matter has no qualities; for of no substance whatever is it permissible to say that it is without qualities. For while describing what kind of thing matter is, the speaker indicates its quality by saying that it is without qualities, for that is a certain kind of quality.

'Therefore, if you please, take up the argument again from the beginning against me; since in my opinion matter has qualities eternally and without beginning. For so I maintain that evils arise from the emanation of matter, in order that God may not be the cause of evils, but matter the cause of them all.'

'I welcome your ready zeal, my friend, and commend your earnestness in these discussions. For certainly every one who wishes to learn ought not to assent simply and at random to what is said, but should make a strict examination of'the arguments. For even if the opponent by giving a false definition affords his adversary an opportunity of drawing such a conclusion as he pleases, it does not follow that he will persuade the hearer of this, but if he shall say what seems possible to be said fairly. From which one of two things must follow; for either he will gain the full benefit of hearing an answer to the question which seems to be stirred, or he will convict his opponent in the argument of saying what is not true.

'I think then that you ought not to have stated that matter possesses qualities eternally. For if this is so, of what will God be the maker? For whether we say substances, these we affirm existed before; or on the other hand qualities, these also were there.

'Since therefore substance exists, and qualities also, it seems to me superfluous to say that God is a creator. But that I may not seem to be arranging an argument for myself, do you now answer the question, in what way do you say that God is a creator? Is it that He changed the substances so that they were no longer those which they once were, but became others different from them? Or that He kept the substances the same that they were before, but changed their qualities? '

'I do not at all think that there has been any change of substances: for this appears to me an absurd thing to say. But I assert that there has been a certain change of the qualities, in respect to which I say that God is a creator; just as if one should chance to say that a house has been made out of stones, of which we cannot say that they are no longer stones in their substance, when the stones have become a house.

'For I say that the house has been made by the quality of construction, the former quality of the stones having evidently been changed. Just so it seems to me that God also, while the substance remains, has made a certain change in its qualities, in reference to which I say that the creation of this world has come from God.'

'Since therefore you assert that a certain change of the qualities has come from God, answer me a few questions which I propose to ask. Tell me now whether like myself you also think that evils are qualities of substances? '

'I think so.'

'And were these qualities in matter eternally, or had they a beginning of existence?'

'I say that these very qualities were eternally co-existent with matter.'

'But do you not say that God has made some change of the qualities?'

'That is what I say.'

'Was the change then for the better or for the worse? '

'I am disposed to say, for the better.'

'Well then, if evils are qualities of matter, and God changed its qualities for the better, we are compelled to ask, whence came the evils. For the qualities did not remain of the same kind as they were by nature. Either, if there were no evil qualities previously, but such qualities, you say, have grown around the matter from the first qualities having been changed by God, God must be responsible for the evils, as having changed what were not evil qualities so that they now are evil.

'Or do you not think that God changed the evil qualities for the better, but say that the rest, and so many only as were neither good nor bad for the purpose of arranging the world, have been changed by God? '

'So I held from the beginning.'

'How then do you say that He has left the qualities of the bad as they were? Was it that He was able to annihilate them also, but had not the will; or that He had not the power? For if you say that He had the power but not the will, you must necessarily admit that He is responsible for them, because though He had power to bring evils to an end, He permitted them to remain as they were, especially at the time when He began to operate on matter.

'For if He had taken no care at all about matter, He would not have been responsible for what He permitted to remain. But when He began to operate on a certain portion of it, but left a portion as it was, though He had power to change that also for the better, it seems to me that He incurred the responsibility of causing it, as having left a portion of matter to be mischievous in the destruction of the part on which He operated.

'Moreover in regard to this part it seems to me that the very greatest wrong has been done: this part, I mean, of matter which He so arranged that it now participates in evils. For if one were to examine the facts carefully, he would find that matter has now fallen into a worse condition than its former disorder. For before it was arranged in order, it might have had no sensation at all of evil; but now each of its parts becomes sensible of evils.

'Now let me give you an example in the case of a man. For before he was fashioned and made a living creature by the Creator's skill, he had from his nature the advantage of not participating in any evil at all: but from the time of his being made man by God, he also receives the sensation of approaching evil, and this, which you say has been done by God for the benefit of matter, is found rather to have been added to it for the worse.

'But if you say that the reason why evils have not been made to cease was that God was not able to annihilate them, you will be asserting that God is deficient in power: and the want of power will mean either that He is by nature weak, or that being overcome by fear He has been brought into subjection by some greater power.

'If then you will dare to say that God is weak by nature, you seem to me to be in danger for your very salvation: but if through being overcome by fear from the greater power, the evils will be greater than God, as prevailing over the impulse of His will; which seems to me an absurd thing to say of God.

'For why will not rather these evils be gods, as being able according to your argument to overcome God, since we say that God is that which has the authority over all things?

'I wish, however, to ask you a few questions also about matter itself. So tell me now, whether matter was something simple or compound: for the diversity of its products brings me round to such a mode of examining this subject. Since if matter was simple and uniform, but the world compound, and composed out of different substances and mixtures, (it is impossible to say that it has been made out of matter, because compounds cannot be composed out of a single thing which has no qualities); for "compound" signifies a mixture of several simple things.

'But if on the other hand you should choose to say that matter is compound, you must of course say that it has been composed out of certain simple things. Now if it was composed out of simple things, those simple things once existed by themselves, and matter has come from their composition; whence also it is shown to be created.

'For if matter is compound, and compounds are constituted out of simples, there was once a time when matter did not exist, that is to say, before the simples came together. But if there was once a time when matter did not exist, but never a time when the uncreate did not exist, matter cannot be uncreate. Henceforward, however, there will be many uncreate things. For if God was uncreate, as well as the simple elements out of which matter was composed, the uncreate will not be two only.

But is it your opinion that no existing thing is contrary to itself?'

'It is.'

'And is water contrary to fire? '

'It appears to me contrary.'

'And in like manner darkness to light, and heat to cold, and also moist to dry? '

'I think it is so.'

'Therefore if no existing thing is contrary to itself, (and these are contrary to each other) they will not be one and the same matter, nor yet from the same matter. I wish, however, to ask you again another question like this. Do you think that the parts of a thing are not destructive one of another? '

'I do.'

'And that fire and water, and the rest in like manner, are parts of matter? '

'They are so.'

'Well then? Do you not think that water is destructive of fire, and light of darkness, and all the other similar cases? '

'I do think so.'

'Therefore if the parts of a thing are not destructive one of another, while the parts of matter are destructive one of another, they will not be parts one of another: and if they are not parts one of another, they will not be parts of the same matter: nay more, they will not themselves he matter, because, according to the adversary's argument, no existing thing is destructive of itself.

'For nothing is contrary to itself; because it is the nature of contraries to be contrary to others. As for example white is not contrary to itself, but is said to be the contrary of black: and light is shown in like manner not to be contrary to itself, but appears to have that relation to darkness, and very many other things of course in the same way.

'If therefore there were also one kind of matter only, it would not be contrary to itself: but since such is the nature of contraries, it is proved that the one only kind of matter has no existence.'

So far the author before mentioned. And since the discourse has now been sufficiently extended, we will pass on to the eighth book of the Preparation for the Gospel; and after invoking the help of God, will fill up what is wanting to the preceding speculation. [Prep. Evang. 7.2.21]

And in the Philocalia the same information is cited albeit with the following caveat:

The foregoing is taken from Book VII. of the Praeparatio Evangelica of Eusebius; being, as he says, the work of Maximus, a Christian writer of some distinction. But it has been discovered word for word in Origen's discussion with the Marcionites and other heretics, Eutropius defending, Megethius opposing.

The Earliest Witnesses to De Recta in Deum Fide

The strongest argument for thinking that the original text of De Recta in Deum Fide only involved a single heretic - Megethius the Marcionite - is because this is what our earlier sources tells us.  From Pretty in the introduction to his translation:

Practically all writers of ancient and mediaeval times refer to the author of the Dialogue under the name of Origen. The earliest mention of the work is in the Philocalia of Origen, which is a selection of passages from Origen's writings made by St. Basil of Caesarea (ca. 330-379) and St. Gregory of Nazianzus (ca. 329-389). At the end of chapter 24 stands the following:

The preceding has been drawn from the Preparation for the Gospel of Eusebius of Palestine, Book 7. He says it is from Maximus, a writer of some importance among Christians. But exactly the same words have been found in the Dialogue of Origen against Marcionites and other heretics in which Eutropius is adjudicator, and Megethius the opposing speaker.

Assuming that Basil and Gregory are responsible for this statement, it can hardly have been written later than 379 (the death of Basil) and therefore our Dialogue must have been composed earlier than this. The Philocalia declaration also makes it clear that towards the latter part of the fourth century, the work was attributed by some to Origen.

The next witness is Rufinus (ca. 345-410), who probably made his translation of the Dialogue soon after 387. If one accepts his was the initial inscription (see supra), he definitely claims Origen as the author. However, the next writer to refer to the book, Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrrhus (ca. 393-458), makes an important distinction. In the preface to his Compendium of Heretical Fables he says, that he had "collected these fables of the ancient heresies from the ancient teachers of the Church — Justin, Origen, and Adamantius. Here Adamantius is given a place separate from Origen. Another certain reference is found in the Guide of Anastasius Sinaita (d. ca. 700). Among other material, this book contains 154 Questions and Answers. Although Anastasius is thought not to be responsible for their present form, their main substance no doubt goes back to him. The answer to Question 48 is "Of Origen, from the Dialogue against Megethius the Marcionite". There follows a somewhat free translation of a passage from the First Part of the Dialogue (from sect. 818c). [p. 9 - 10]
 
I think this is enough for us to begin our investigation.  Whenever I hear that an ancient author has a 'loose citation' of an existing text, my ears perk up because I begin to suspect this is a more original version of the material.  To this end, I find it at least possible that Anastasius is citing from the original text of the Dialogue - one directed only against Megethius the Marcionite - and that the circle of Origenists 'corrected' the original text in order to make their spiritual master Origen seem less heretical. 

Deciphering De Recta in Deum Fide

I've just ordered Pretty's 1997 translation of De Recta in Deum Fide. I resisted purchasing it because up until now I have been using Danny Mahar's private translation of the 'Marcionite portions' of the text.   Mahar sent me his original material at the end of the 20th century.  I considered it 'good enough' at the time because I was only interested in what Adamantius says about the Marcionite sect.  Yet now - under Harris's suggestion - I am increasingly convinced that the entire text has been transformed.  In my last post I demonstrated two reasons for thinking so.  Yet there are many more. 

I am going to set about proving that the original dialogue consisted of a debate between a Marcionite and an Orthodox named Adamantius.  This lost original text 'knew' or had access to the Antitheses of Marcion (as per Harris's thesis).  As such it must not only have been earlier than the existing text which is dated from at least the very late third to the early fourth century, but also must have been independent or perhaps even earlier than the rest of the surviving anti-Marcionite literature including Tertullian's Five Books Against Marcion.

As it stands now the Dialogue consists of a discussion between a Christian, Adamantius, two Marcionites (Megethius and Marcus) and a follower of Bardesanes (Marinus).  What we are suggesting is that our lost proto-text consisted only of a dialogue with a Marcionite and this original material was 'scrambled' - a consistent feature of the Orthodox revision of heretical material.  I can see clear evidence that the third or fourth century editor drew upon Irenaeus's Against Heresies to manufacture the new 'multi-person' text.  The question that stands before us is how effectively I can piece together the original proto-text from the existing - and necessarily corrupt - material. 

Wednesday, May 8, 2013

The Original De Recta in Deum Fide

Ulrich Schmidt didn't know what to do with De Recta in Deum Fide - commonly known as 'the Dialogues of Adamantius - a lengthy text where an orthodox figure (= 'Adamantius') debates various heretics starting with a Marcionite named 'Megethius.'  Schmid recognized that the text we possess is hopelessly corrupt.  But surely there is an authentic core to the material but if so what is it?  Schmid's decision was to basically ignore the evidence from Adamantius in favor of Tertullian and Epiphanius.  Of course his interests were rather limited.  Yet I am not prepared to throw in the towel on De Recta in Deum Fide. 

I have been very influenced by Harris's idea that the section where Adamantius attacks a Valentinian was originally referencing Marcion.  If Harris is right - and I think he is - this section was changed from an attack against Marcion's Antitheses to an anti-Valentinian narrative.  Why would the editors have done this?  Harris never provides an explanation but I think I have an answer - the text was too sensible.  It gave the Marcionite opinions too much air to breathe.  It allowed people to 'make sense' of what the Marcionites believed and so - at some later stage - the original treatise was altered to make it seem as if Adamantius took aim at many heretics rather than Megethius the Marcionite. 

I found another example of this 'cut and paste' exercise.  In the first section an argument which starts with Megethius ends up getting placed in the 'second Marcionite' (= 'Marcus' a Marcionite who follows what we might call the 'classic model' of black and white dualism).  We read in the first section of the text Megethius (= MEG) bring up to Adamantius (= AD) in front of the judge Eutropius (EUTR) the four evangelists but only deals with two specifically - i.e. Mark and Luke:

AD. Will you agree if I show from the Gospels that they are not fabrications?
MEG. I will agree if you prove it. First state the names of the Gospel writers.
AD. The disciples of Christ wrote them: John and Matthew; Mark and Luke.
MEG. Christ did not have Mark and Luke as disciples, so you and your party are convicted of producing spurious writings. Why is it that the disciples whose names are recorded in the Gospel did not write, while men who were not disciples did? Who is Luke? Who is Mark? You are therefore convicted of bringing forward names not recorded in the Scriptures.
EUTR. If Christ had disciples, would He not have committed the work to them rather than to men who were not disciples? Something seems wrong here. The disciples themselves ought rather to have been entrusted with the task.
AD. These men are also disciples of Christ.
MEG. Let the Gospel be read, and you will find that their names are not recorded.
EUTR. Let it be read.
AD. The names of the twelve apostles have been read, but not of the seventy-two.
EUTR. How many apostles had Christ ?
AD. First he sent out twelve and, after that, seventy-two to preach the gospel. Therefore, Mark and Luke, who are among the seventy-two, preached the gospel together with Paul the apostle.
MEG: It is impossible that these [two] ever saw Paul.

The argument does not make sense as it stands as Megethius's point is to argue that the Catholic gospels were not written by disciples of Jesus.  He only deals with Mark and Luke here.  In order to prove his point he has to show that Matthew and John also weren't eyewitnesses. 

This line of reasoning now only gets taken up in the second section of the Dialogue, not by Megethius but his 'stand in' Marcus.  Indeed the argument as it now stands drops out of the sky as Pretty notes in his translation "The transition is somewhat abrupt. The Latin translator must have felt this, for he makes Megethius say, 'This conclusion (i.e., the judgement of Eutropius) is reached by argumentation, but 1 want to prove what I say from the Gospel writings. But I will first show that the Gospels which you people read are false'. As the above passage down to the words "Gospel writings" is absent from the Greek MSS, Bakhuyzen rightly deletes it as unoriginal. Nevertheless it serves to highlight what was already been said, that the writer of the Dialogue has produced a work which, though valuable as it is in other ways, sometimes suffers from a lack of cohesion as one argument ends and another begins." [p. 41]

This lack of cohesion can best be explained as a deliberate attempt of the editor to not only 'rebaptize' or 'recontextualize' certain key passages (= Harris's claim that parts of the 'Valentinian' section were originally directed against Marcion's Antitheses) but to 'chop them up' and spread them all over different parts of the Dialogue.  Notice now for instance that this critical section of part two of De Recta in Deum Fide must originally have followed the last section, even though they are separated by over fifty pages in Petty's translation:

EUTR. How is it, Marcus, that your party do not accept those who were sent out by Christ to preach and proclaim the Gospel, yet you do accept one for whom you offer no proof? Why is it that you disparage Matthew and John, whose names are recorded in Scripture, and whom Christ sent out to preach and proclaim the Gospel, but accept Paul, for whom you have no proof? Surely this is ridiculous? Tell us this at least: Did they proclaim and preach the Gospel or not?
MK. They proclaim the Gospel.
EUTR. Was their proclamation and preaching of the Gospel recorded or unrecorded?
MK. It was unrecorded.
EUTR. It is quite absurd to assert on the one hand that those who were sent out to preach and proclaim the Gospel did so unrecorded, and on the other to claim that Paul, who had not been sent out, taught and was recorded! [p. 91]

In other words, the Marcionite originally made it clear that neither the gospel of Matthew, the gospel of Mark, the gospel of Luke, nor the Gospel of John was written by a disciple of Jesus.  It was a wholly spurious composition - an argument whose force is now diminished because the section has been broken up and placed in two different sections of the narrative.

Saturday, May 4, 2013

The Most Important Section of the Gospel

I am in the great state of Texas and have been for the last week.  I really love it down here.  I find the people incredibly friendly and always have time to stop and chat.  I am the kind of person who starts up a conversation with anyone almost to see how the other person will react.  I guess I am sort of judging the various people I meet to see how they might handle the unknown.  I don't know I don't do these things deliberately.  As I am someone who enjoys - even reveres - the process of becoming I like finding out what people are made of, what makes people tick.  It never ceases to amaze me. 

So it is that I have been spending my time rediscovering this alien culture where everyone seems a lot be a whole lot friendlier.  It's been a while since I've been away from home.  You kind get in touch with yourself when you are away from the wife and kids.  It's strange how what we do in life takes the place of who we are.  It silently creeps up on you.  Before you know it, you become someone elses.  Maybe that's a good thing.  I just saying, it's strange to see how far we can get from who we really are. 

In any event, one thing that never quite leaves me is my interest in philosophy and religion.  I don't know where this comes from.  I was recently asked by a major television celebrity - what drew you to this field?  I really don't know.  I remember one of my high school American history teachers couldn't believe that I was reading Nietzsche in my senior year.  I didn't see what the big deal was.  My father was always into books.  I associated with manhood I guess. A man is what he knows not what he has, is a fundamental belief I inherited.  Of course my Dad wasn't rich.  I guess if he was a big business executive I would have inherited other values. 

But this brings up a fundamental question - was my Dad not wealthy because of choice or was it determined by his personality?  I have never believed in freedom of will so I would have to say the latter.  Of course when people here that someone denies free will they get this crazy look.  Of course we have contol of our destinies; we are the choices we've made.  The fact that everyone thinks this only reinforces my original suspicion. 

For surely if people had the ability to choose what they wanted to believe there would be a variety of attitudes toward the existence of free will.  Instead everyone comes down on the side of personal choice.  Why is that?  It's simple.  Everyone is an egoist and the doctrine of free will is unbridled egoism. 

The point then is that when I look back at my father I can't help get the sense that his social standing in life was determined by his personality.  He was frugal and because of his frugality he amassed a comfortable retirement income.  But if he had another disposition - one like my own - he would have spent every cent he had and then some. 

It can be argued of course that people who spend every cent they have are 'addicted' to vice and my father was excercising his 'choice' to save money.  But these impulses are determined by personality times rather than the other way around.  All of which brings me to the topic of this thread - the most important section of the gospel - namely the Question of the Rich Man. 

The point of the narrative clearly is that the rich man clearly says that he has observed all of the commandments and presumably - according to the understanding of the original author of the gospel - has become rich and just.  Yet the question he asks - how do I attain eternal life? - leads to a most surprising answer, if you want to be perfect sell everything you own.  Clement's Alexandrian tradition interprets this as meaning - give up your life, give up what you are, in other words - die and come back alive again as god. 

Who can't help but interpret this as a philosophical principle?  In other words, all we are has been determined from birth according to the pattern of the original creation according to the flesh.  The only way to wipe this clean is by wiping the slate clean and starting all over again - a new creation.  But not a 'new creation' according to the empty rituals of a morbid church tradition but one which is akin to dropping acid or some such psychedelic drug. 

You really can rebuild your nature according to perfection.  You don't have to be trapped in the fate determined for you since birth.  I think this is the original Christian message.  It is of course one which has subsequently been 'corrected' and expunged from the surviving tradition.  But the symbolism is still there if you look hard enough for it. 
 
Stephan Huller's Observations by Stephan Huller
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