It is really getting late tonight but I thought I would stop and give my readership an example of why I am so excited about this new discovery. The first and most obvious point here is that all previous studies of the Letter to Theodore (how many are there really?) get it wrong. What Clement is referencing here is quite specific - the incorrectness of heretical exegesis of the gospel. For example Clement introduces a certain 'Carpocrates' and:
the mystic Gospel, which he both explained (ἐξηγήσατο) according to his blasphemous and carnal (καὶ σαρκικὲν) opinion (δόξας) and, moreover, stained (ἐμίανε); the unstained (ἀχράντοι) and holy words being utterly mixed with shameless lies (ψευσματα). From this mixture (κραματος) is drawn off the Carpocratian dogma (Καρποκρατιανῶν δόγμα)
Again, Clement never says that Carpocrates or his followers altered the shared gospel in any way. Rather it is the 'dogma' of the Carpocratians which is being attacked:
For the true things being mixed with inventions, are falsified, so that, as the saying goes, even the salt becomes dull.
There are an unusual number of references to the idea of two things being 'mixed' in the Letter to Theodore. One to St. Mark's 'appropriate' mixture of two hypomnemata and two rejections of the Carpocratians adulterous mixture of doctrine. I happen to think that Strom. 7.16 takes the explanation one step further.
I don't want to reveal everything I am working on but the reader can see the work as it progresses here. Yet here is a small sample from what I consider to be a related concept in the conclusion of the Stromata. Notice at once that Clement has just been attacking the heretics for refusing to incorporate the canonical gospels, apostolic writings and the prophetic literature of Judaism to make sense of the commonly held mystic gospel. Instead they want to only interpret the Gospel on its own or according to an oral tradition associated with the text:
For we may not give attention to a single (ἁπλῶς) proclamation of men (ἀποφαινομένοις ἀνθρώποις) who might equally state the opposite. But if it is not enough to singly (ἁπλῶς) state the opinion (τὸ δόξαν), but if what is laid down (τὸ λεχθέν) must be confirmed (πιστώσασθαι), we do not wait for the testimony of men (τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀναμένομεν μαρτυρίαν) but we establish the matter that is in question by the voice of the Lord (τοῦ κυρίου φωνῇ), which is the surest (πιστούμεθα) of all demonstrations (ἣ πασῶν ἀποδείξεων), or rather is the only demonstration (ἣ μόνη ἀπόδειξις); in which knowledge those who have merely tasted the Scriptures are believers (τῶν γραφῶν πιστοί); while those who, having advanced further, and become correct expounders of the truth, are Gnostics (γνώμονες τῆς ἀληθείας ὑπάρχουσιν, οἱ γνωστικοί).
Since also, in what pertains to life, artists (τεχνῖται) are superior to ordinary people, and model what is beyond common notions (τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας); so, consequently, we also, giving a complete exhibition of the Scriptures from the Scriptures themselves (ἀπ´ αὐτῶν περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν γραφῶν τελείως ἀποδεικνύντες), from faith persuade by demonstration (ἐκ πίστεως πειθόμεθα ἀποδεικτικῶς).
And if those also who follow heresies who dare to use the apostolic writings (προφητικαῖς χρήσασθαι γραφαῖς); in the first place they will not make use of all of them (πάσαις), and then they will not quote them entire (τελείαις), nor as the body and texture of prophecy prescribe (τῆς προφητείας ὑπαγορεύει). But, selecting ambiguous expressions (ἐκλεγόμενοι τὰ ἀμφιβόλως εἰρημένα), they wrest them to their own opinions (εἰς τὰς ἰδίας μετάγουσι δόξας), gathering a few expressions here and there; not listening to the voice (φωνάς), but making use of the mere words. For in almost all the utterances (ῥητοῖς) they make, you will find that they attend to the phrases alone (τοῖς ὀνόμασι μόνοις), while they alter their meaning (τὰ σημαινόμενα ὑπαλλάττοντες); neither knowing, as they affirm, nor using the quotations they adduce (κομίζουσιν ἐκλογαῖς), according to their true nature.
But the truth (ἀλήθεια) is not found by changing the meaning (τῷ μετατιθέναι τὰ σημαινόμενα) - for so people subvert all true teaching (πᾶσαν ἀληθῆ διδασκαλίαν) - but in the consideration of what perfectly belongs to and is in harmony with the Lord and the All-Powerful God (τῷ κυρίῳ καὶ τῷ παντοκράτορι θεῷ), and in establishing each one of the points demonstrated in the Scriptures again from similar Scriptures (τῶν ἀποδεικνυμένων κατὰ τὰς γραφὰς ἐξ αὐτῶν πάλιν τῶν ὁμοίων γραφῶν). Neither, then, do they want to turn to the truth (τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐθέλουσιν), being ashamed to abandon the claims of self-love; nor are they able to manage their opinions, by doing violence to the Scriptures. But having first promulgated false dogmas to men (τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δόγματα ψευδῆ); plainly fighting against almost the whole Scriptures (ταῖς γραφαῖς ἐναργῶς μαχόμενοι), and constantly confuted by us who contradict them
For the rest, even now partly they hold out against admitting the apostolic Scriptures, and partly disparage us as of a different nature, and incapable of understanding what is peculiar to them. And sometimes even they deny their own dogmas (τὰ ἑαυτῶν διελεγχόμενοι ἀρνοῦνται δόγματα), when these are confuted, being ashamed openly to own what in private they glory in teaching (ἄντικρυς ὁμολογεῖν αἰδούμενοι ἃ κατ´ ἰδίαν αὐχοῦσι διδάσκοντες). For this may be seen in all the heresies, when you examine the iniquities of their dogmas (ἐπιόντας αὐτῶν τὰς μοχθηρίας τῶν δογμάτων).
I am increasingly certain that this section of text is rooted in Stoic grammatical theory. It is impossible to make sense of it the way most Patristic scholars have attempted it. You have to identify the philosophical categories Clement is adopting and then filter what is written of the heretics through that screen.
Here is something that is sure to help. Anneli Luhtala's On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. We will cite here Chapter 5 which deals with the Stoics, and one section in particular:
5.5.2 - The Components of Expression (Σημαινοντα, Semainonta)
and Meaning (Σημαινόμενα, Semainomena)
Previously we noted that the Stoics divided dialectic into two parts:
a) 'that which signifies'(σημαινοντα, semainonta), or 'vocal sounds' (φωναι, phonai). and
b) 'that which is signified' (σημαινόμενα, semainomena), or 'meaning' (again, σημαινόμενα, semainomena), or 'sayable' (λεκτά, lekta).
[Note that Mates translates semainon (σημαινον) as the 'significans,' which is equivalent to the sign, signal, sound, or Zeichen. The sound "Di - on" is the significans for Dion. The semainomenon (σημαινομενον) he calls the 'significate,' and it is equivalent to the connotation, intension, sense, thought/concept, Sinn, or lekton (λεκτον). The significate is what the Barbarian does not understand when he hears the sound "Di - on." And it is incorporeal. Finally he calls tygchanon (τυγχάνον) 'that which exists.' It is the same as the denotation, extension, meaning, external object, or Bedeutung. In our example, Dion himself is 'that which exists.']
The 'word' (λέξις, lexis) is the articulate form of the 'vocal sound' (φωνή, phone). (70b)
Luhtala will call "expression" the component of
σημαινοντα/φωναι/λέξις
(semainonta/phonai/lexis)
(that which signifies/vocal sounds/word).
And she will call "meaning" or "sayables" the component of
σημαινόμενα/λεκτά
(semainomena/lekta)
(that which is signified/sayable).
Aristotle merely distinguished two constituents of the roposition: ‘noun’/‘subject’ (ονομα, onoma) and ‘verb’/‘predicate’ (ρημα, rema). The Stoics however developed a much more detailed system. (71d)
True and false statements are made in the meaning component (σημαινόμενα, semainomena). (72c)
truth and falsehood do not pertain to individual words (φωναι, phonai) but to their combination. (72c)
Hence truth and falsity are part of incorporeal meaning. According to Diogenes Laertius,
Φωνή (Phone, 'voice') differs from λέξις (lexis, 'articulated sound'). Because, while the former may include mere noise, the latter is always articulate. Λέξις (Lexis, ‘articulate sound') again differs from λόγος (logos, ‘speech’ or ‘sentence’) because the latter always signifies something, whereas a λέξις (lexis, 'articulated sound'), as for example blituri, may be unintelligible, which a λόγος (logos, ‘speech’ or ‘sentence’) never is. And speaking/saying (λέγειν, legein) is different from uttering (προφέρεσθαι, propheresthai); for while vocal sounds (φωναι, phonai) are uttered, states of affairs (πράγματα, pragmata) are said, and sayables pertain to states of affairs. [Diog. Laert. VII, 56-57] (qt 72-73) [See another translation and discussion of Deleuze's distinction between the corporeal and incorporeal at this entry.]
Here we distinguish two types of speech acts associated with two kinds of linguistic items:
1) uttering (προφέρεσθαι, propheresthai) associated with vocal sounds (φωναι, phonai). These belong to the expression component; and
2) speaking (λέγειν, legein) associated with states of affairs (πράγματα, pragmata). As well, sayables (λεκτά, lekta) also pertain to states of affairs. These belong to the meaning component.
Diogenes of Babylon notes that both the articulate speech of discourse and raw vocal sounds come from the throat. He concludes that we do not construct meaning in our minds, but from deeper down in our bodies, in our hearts. (74a-c) Chrysippus makes the same argument. (74d)
Sayables could be uttered, but they need not be. Chrysippus says that they belong to the "preparation of utterance in the mind." (75bc)
But when sayables are actually spoken, they take the form of corporeal speech (λόγω, logo).
the rational impression (φαντασία, phantasia) comes first, then thought which is able to speak (διάνοια έκλαλητική, dianoia eklaletike) expresses its experience by means of speech (λόγω, logo). [Diog. Laert. VII, 49] (75c)
Stoics further made semantic distinctions in ontological terms. Phonetic vocal utterances belong to the corporeal sphere. Thinking and statement-making belong to the incorporeal sphere.
The voice (φωνή, phone) is corporeal, because it "has an effect." (75d) Diogenes Laertius writes:
For whatever produces an effect is body; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect for whatever produces an effect is corporeal. Voice, as it proceeds form those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect. [diog. Laert. VII, 55 = SVF, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, 2.140 tr. R.H. Hicks; cf. Aet. Plac. IV 20, 2 = SVF 2.387 and Suda s.v. σωμα soma]. (qtd 75-76, emphasis mine)
For the Stoic's semantic ontology, there are three units:
a) the corporeal sound (for Mates: significans) ,
b) its 'signification' (significate), and
c) the referent (that which exists).
The corporeal sound and its signification belong to the domain of dialectic. The referent or "the object in the external world" is what activates our impressions. It belongs to the Stoic's physical theory. Sextus Empiricus describes these distinctions:
The Stoics defended the first opinion (according to which true and false is a question of the signification), saying that three things are linked together, 'the signification', 'the signifier', and 'the name-bearer'. The signifier is an utterance, for instance 'Dion'; the signified is the actual state of affairs revealed by an utterance, which we apprehend as it subsists in accordance with our thought whereas it is not understood by those whose language is different although they hear the utterance; the name-bearer is the external object, for instance, Dion himself. Of these, two are bodies – the utterance and the name-bearer; but one is incorporeal – the state of affairs signified and sayable, which is true or false. [Adv. math. VIII, 11-13, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 195] (qt 76bc)
Luhtala explains that the authentic Stoic sources to not make such clear-cut distinctions. For example, the word "Dion" by itself cannot be true or false. Only a proposition like "Dion walks" can have that property. (77a-b)
What I am starting to work out now through a side by side reading of the Letter to Theodore and the material just cited from the Stromata is that Clement's rejection of the heresies is developed from Stoic theory of grammar and literary exgesis.
In other words, 'the false mixture' of Carpocratian dogma in to Theodore is identical with what Clement identifies as altering the σημαινόμενα in a Stromata:
you will find that they attend to the phrases alone (τοῖς ὀνόμασι μόνοις), while they alter their meaning (τὰ σημαινόμενα ὑπαλλάττοντες); neither knowing, as they affirm, nor using the quotations they adduce (κομίζουσιν ἐκλογαῖς), according to their true nature.
But the truth (ἀλήθεια) is not found by changing the meaning (τῷ μετατιθέναι τὰ σημαινόμενα) - for so people subvert all true teaching (πᾶσαν ἀληθῆ διδασκαλίαν) - but in the consideration of what perfectly belongs to and is in harmony with the Lord and the All-Powerful God (τῷ κυρίῳ καὶ τῷ παντοκράτορι θεῷ), and in establishing each one of the points demonstrated in the Scriptures again from similar Scriptures (τῶν ἀποδεικνυμένων κατὰ τὰς γραφὰς ἐξ αὐτῶν πάλιν τῶν ὁμοίων γραφῶν).
Of course it all comes down to what Clement means by 'the voice of God' or 'voice of the Lord.' Clement clearly understands that the there is a commonly held non-canonical gospel between the heretics and his 'official' Church of Alexandria (Strom. 3.1 - 10). But where the heretics disagree apparently with his insistence that this 'pure' Gospel must be interpreted by means of the rest of Scripture (i.e. a body of writings which included elements which we might identify as 'the New Testament' viz. the canonical gospels, Acts etc.). I will put forward that the heretics were making the case that the canonical gospel of Mark was an impure 'mixture' of things of the Law and prophets and the gospel and - in the manner of Papias - that the evangelist developed the canonical text 'grudgingly and incautiously.'
Clement's charge against them was that the heretics might have preserved the 'voice of the Lord' purely (i.e. that they indeed possessed the 'mystic' gospel) but other part of that grammatic 'mixture' - i.e. the σημαινόμενα - was adulterated and so their dogma was 'falsified.' In other words, the Carpocratians must have rejected canonical Mark while Clement claims (and demonstrates in to Theodore) that the text is essential to make sense of 'secret' Mark.
